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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/Appellant Michael S. Robinson ("Robinson") hereby submits
his Reply Brief in response to the brief filed on behalf of Defendants and
Respondents Stephen C. Clark ("Clark'1, Melissa Bean ("Bean") and the law
firm of Jones Waldo Holbrook McDonough ("Jones Waldo") (collectively "the
Lawyers"). Despite the arguments submitted by the Lawyers, this Court
should reverse the lower court because:
1. It erred in ruling that Robinson was required to submit counter-

affidavits to the Lawyers' summary judgment motion (a) when the Lawyers'
own summary judgment submissions contained Robinson's sworn testimony
that created issues of material fact on both causation and standard of care; (b)
even more certainly when the court relied upon additional evidence
presented by the Lawyers in connection with a second motion that contained
further sworn statements by Robinson creating issues of material fact; and (c)
then ignoring Robinson's sworn statements and submissions in connection
with the second motion which further revealed disputes of material facts on
the Lawyers' breaches of duty and causation.
2. The lower court erred in ruling as a matter of law that expert
testimony was required to establish the standard of care when the evidence
included a "smoking gun" -- Clark, the senior attorney assigned to Robinson's
multi-million dollar divorce case, allowed his associate Bean (with only one

year of private practice experience) to represent Robinson at a settlement
conference against a senior and very experienced opposing counsel (Dean
Andreasen), and then Bean failed to follow Clark's express instructions to
include specific provisions in the settlement agreement (which had been
drafted by opposing counsel) to protect Robinson from misrepresentations
and most importantly, from being held to the agreement in the event
Robinson could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza, an event upon which the
division of millions of dollars of assets and sources of income hinged.
3. The lower court erred by deciding causation as a matter of law when
the record clearly shows that the Lawyers' failure to include protective
provisions has cost Robinson millions of dollars and left him impecunious. At
the very least, there is an issue of material fact as to whether (a) it was the
Lawyers' negligence causing his loss, or (b) it was his failure to perform a
completely meaningless act - submit a loan application even though Bean had
specifically instructed Robinson that he did not need to do so until his wife
Debra Robinson ("Ms. Robinson") provided necessary financial and lease
information required for the application and even though the clear terms of
the loan application showed that the Phoenix Plaza failed to meet the
underwriting requirements of the lenders because of a high percentage of
vacancies and/ or no leases.
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4. To the extent that Robinson was required to submit expert
testimony and to respond to the motion, the lower court abused its discretion
by denying Robinson and his new counsel a short, reasonable and justifiable
two-month extension of time. The record is clear that Robinson was not
dilatory, but diligently sought new counsel (over 20 attorneys in four states),
the motion for extension was meritorious, and there would have been
absolutely no prejudice to the Lawyers.
ARGUMENT

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER WHERE THE RECORD
REVEALED CLEAR QUESTIONS OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
THE LAWYERS' NEGLIGENCE AND CAUSATION.

A.

Robinson was Not Required to Submit Affidavits in
Opposition to the Summary Judgment When the Lawyers'
Submissions Showed Disputed Issues of Material Fact and
Other Submissions Relied Upon by the Lower Court
Contained Sworn Statements Creating Issues of Material
Facts.

Rule 56( c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate only when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(e) provides that when a
motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits and other evidence
that the "adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the

pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
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trial." That same rule goes on to state, however, "Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response."

Thus, in 0/well v. Clark, 659 P.2d 585, 586 (Utah 1982) the Court held
that counter-affidavits are not always required if the moving party's
submissions reveal issues of material fact:
[U]nder Rule 56, Utah R.Civ.P., it is not always required that a
party proffer affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment in order to avoid judgment against him. The
[defendants] argue that the summary judgment must be
affirmed because the [plaintiffs] have not complied with Rule
56( c) and (e), having failed to file such affidavits. The rule itself
sets the criteria for the judgment: a party may receive the
judgment requested if (a) the pleadings and affidavits, if any,
show no issue as to any material fact, and (b) the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56( e) states
specifically that a response in opposition to a motion must be
supported by affidavits or other documents only in order to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Where
the party opposed to the motion submits no documents in
opposition, the moving party may be granted summary
judgment only "if appropriate," that is, if he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. [citing Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646
P.2d 678 (1982).
Similarly, in Frisbee v. K&K Const Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1984) 1
the defendant had failed to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but
demonstrated that issues of material fact were present before the lower
court. In reversing the summary judgment, the Court stated:
Where the moving affidavit shows on its face that there is a
material issue of fact, summary judgment may not be entered,
These cases also demonstrate that this court will evaluate the propriety of
summary judgment on appeal even where no opposition was filed.
1

4

even if responsive affidavits are not filed. In this case, [plaintiff]
is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. His
affidavit and supporting documents presented conclusions with
no supporting facts and show unresolved issues of fact.
See Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Woodward v. Board of Directors
of Tamaron Association of Condominium Owners, 155 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. Ct.

App. 2007); People v. Hernandez and Assocs, Inc., 736 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986)("Although it may be perilous for the party opposing summary
judgment not to file a responsive affidavit, ... election not to do so does not
relieve the moving party of its burden to establish that summary judgment is
appropriate .... Here, the People did not meet that burden."); Glassner v.
Northwest Lustre Craft Co., 591 P.2d 419, 420-21 (Or. Ct. App.1979)(summary

judgment reversed where exhibits submitted by moving party showed
disputes of fact).
Contrary to the Lawyers' contentions, Robinson did not merely rely
upon the allegations or denials of the pleadings. He also did not ask the lower
court to "ferret out" facts disclosing material disputes. His position is simple:
if the district court is going to consider the evidence presented, then the
district court must consider all the evidence submitted and view all such facts
and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to Robinson, rather than
picking or choosing among the pieces of evidence or deciding that the
Lawyers' evidence was entitled to greater weight that Robinson's. Even a
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single sworn statement from Robinson (and there were many) is sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo,
888 P.2d 1097, 1100-01 (Utah 1995)(summary judgment reversed because "a
trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be
whether material issues of fact exist."); Willey v. Bu9den, 2013 UT App 297,
,r,r26-27, 318 P.3d 757 (sworn affidavit of plaintiff that he did not receive
plea bargain created an issue of fact and lower court improperly weighed
evidence presented by two attorneys, an assistant, and evidence that the plea
bargain had been sent via Federal Express); Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278,
,r22 , 288 P.3d 26; Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
Ct. App.1988)(and numerous cases cited therein); USA Power, LLC v.
Paciftcorp, 2010 UT App 31,

,r,rs, 7, 235 P.3d 749 (in a summary judgment

proceeding, the understanding, intention, and consequences of facts may
create disputes barring summary judgment because all facts and the
reasonable inferences to be made therefrom should be construed in a light
favorable to the non-moving party).
The record below was replete with factual issues. That "record" did not
simply include affidavits and documents in the Lawyers' initial motion for
summary judgment (which themselves demonstrated issues of fact). The
court also considered, on the merits, additional sworn testimony and
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evidence submitted by the Lawyers in response to Robinson's request for
extension of time. This was revealed in the lower court's ruling when it said:
Additionally, the affidavits, emails, and other evidence
presented by defendants in support of their motion
demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show that any alleged breach
by the defendants caused any loss to him. Plaintiff entered into a
stipulation to resolve his divorce after long negotiations
between him and his ex-wife personally. He accepted and used
the accounting figures given him by his ex-wife after
consultation with his accountant. He clearly wanted to retain
ownership of the Phoenix Plaza and accepted the stipulation
arrived at on Friday, November 2, 2007, without taking even a
weekend to think it over. After the weekend he had second
thoughts and tried to get his attorney's to "stop" the agreement.
By then it was too late; he had signed the agreement and was
bound by it. The emails between plaintiff and defendants
demonstrate that they tried to come up with theories through
which he could be relieved of his responsibility to refinance
but told him the chances were 50/50 at best. Defendants'
emails to plaintiff continually reminded him of his obligation
to refinance the Plaza within 15 days but also show that he
continually put off that obligation hoping to get a better
interest rate and hoping not to have to pay the application fee
for refinancing. Based upon his failure to even attempt to
comply with the stipulation, this Court and other courts have
ruled against him in other cases. Plaintiff cannot show that any
actions by defendants have caused the financial losses he is
facing. As other courts have held, his failure to even attempt to
comply with the stipulation have been the cause of his loss.
This "story line" was one that the Lawyers laid out in their opposition
to Robinson's motion for extension of time, not simply in their original
submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment. The emails
referenced in the summary judgment ruling were attached as Exhibit 7 (R.
651-678) to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Extension of Time.

7

The court reviewed the Lawyers' summary judgment submissions, but
those submissions included Robinson's sworn responses to requests for
admissions which disclosed issues of material fact. When the court then also
considered the Lawyer's extra-summary judgment material, it was obligated
to review Robinson's evidence as well to determine whether actual disputes
of material facts existed. Not only did it fail to do this, but the evidence
actually cited by the lower court does not support its factual conclusions. 2
Robinson's sworn statements presented in the Lawyers' memoranda
and Robinson's submissions on his motion for extension of time, tell a very
different story from that proffered by the Lawyers and recited by the district
court. Robinson asserts that after the signing of the stipulation, he specifically
needed the year-to-date income and expense statement and lease information
from Ms. Robinson before he could even make a loan application to refinance
the Plaza. Ms. Robinson failed to provide it and that during the first week
Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 5 (continuing from the numbering of
Addendum Exhibits from Robinson's Opening Brief) is a compilation of the evidence
submitted by the Lawyers in their motion for summary judgment which revealed
patent disputes of material facts and which was previously cited in Robinson's
initial brief. Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 6 is a compilation of the
additional evidence submitted by the Lawyers in connection with the motion for
extension of time that bore on the merits of the summary judgment motion and was
obviously considered by the lower court. Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 7 is
a compilation of the evidence submitted by Robinson in connection with the motion
for extension of time which bore directly on the merits of the motion for summary
judgment. And attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 8 is a chronological
compilation of the email communications presented to the court which show that
the Lawyer's characterization of those emails and the court's interpretation thereof
was clearly wrong.
2

8

after the stipulation, Bean specifically told Robinson that he did not need to
make the loan application because Ms. Robinson was breaching the
stipulation by not cooperating and providing the necessary information to do
so. See R. 404,408,411,684,685, and 714-716.
Bean has essentially admitted and/or corroborated the foregoing facts
in her Affidavit (R. 688-92). She admitted that the stipulation required Ms.
Robinson to provide necessary information to Robinson to make a loan
application; that Ms. Robinson did not provide that information until
February 2008; that after the information was received, it was learned that
the Plaza did not qualify for refinancing; and that Ms. Robinson's failure to
provide the financial and lease information constituted a "first breach" of the
stipulation. See Addendum Ex. 4 at ,r,r4, 5, 6, 12, and 13.
The lower court's conclusion that the Lawyers were continually telling
Robinson to file an application by November 17, 2007 is patently false. The
emails, placed in chronological order (App. Ex. 8), reveal that at no time
between November 2 and November 17, 2007 (the putative loan application
date) did Bean modify her prior verbal advice that Robinson need not file a
loan application until Ms. Robinson provided the required financial and lease
information. The emails further show that as of Nqvember 26, 2007 (11 days
after the loan application was to have been made) Bean was asking Robinson
if he had received the necessary information from Ms. Robinson to review the
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mall status; that Robinson continually expressed his concern about being able
to conclude a refinancing within 12 0 days, but that he was diligently working
on it (to the extent that he could without the requisite information) and was
watching interest rates closely, especially since it was becoming more
apparent that the Plaza's stipulated value was too high (11/29 /07); Bean was
suggesting that Robinson seek Ms. Robinson's consent to modify the
r·:
WI

agreement (11/29 /07); Bean questioned whether Ms. Robinson was working
with Robinson to get a good deal on the mortgage (11/29 /07); Robinson was
making progress on a loan (11/29/07); several important matters (e.g.
security deposits, pre-paid rent, rents received by Ms. Robinson on the Deer
Valley Condo) had not been adequately addressed at the mediation and
whether the parties would go back to mediation (11/29-30/07); Bean was
suggesting to opposing counsel that the time to complete the refinance should
be extended; problems were arising at the Plaza with leaking roofs that
needed to be repaired; Ms. Robinson had misrepresented the net income from
the Plaza; Robinson was concerned about making a loan application that
would be denied as it would cost him a 1-2% fee to lock in any rates [over
$70,000]; Bean was suggesting additional mediation (11/30/07); Andreasen
advised that Ms. Robinson would deal directly with Robinson to get issues
resolved (12/5/07); Bean was suggesting that the date for the refinancing to
occur should be extended (12/5/07); other issues besides the actual
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refinancing were at the forefront of discussion (12/5/07); two key tenants'
roofs were leaking and the repairs needed to be addressed and paid for
(12/7 /07 and 12/9 /07); Bean was continuing to confirm that Ms. Robinson
was required to cooperate in making a loan application (12/9/07); and Ms.
Robinson still had not provided necessary information (12/10-11/07).
The emails presented to the court resumed March 17, 2008, after Ms.
Robinson finally provided the requested rent and financial information in
February. It was then formally documented that the Plaza would not qualify
for a loan because of the un-leased space. In response to that information,
Bean emailed that she was going to conduct research on "impossibility" and
"first to breach" (3 /17 /08). Contrary to the Lawyers' contentions, Robinson is
not relying on this email to assert that Bean was counseling him on the "first
to breach" doctrine. Bean had told him this within a week of the mediation
and the signing of the stipulation. The 3 /17 /08 email only confirmed what
Bean had earlier told Robinson.
Thereafter, the only request from the Lawyers for Robinson to make a
loan application was for litigation posturing. Knowing full well that the loan
application would be denied, Clark simply wanted it to prove to the court that
it was impossible to refinance the Plaza. See emails of 10/11/08 and 11/7 /08.
The evidence presented by the Lawyers' and by Robinson summarized
in App. Exs. 5-8 contradicts virtually every aspect of the Lawyers' theory of
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the case. The lower court improperly granted summary judgment with those
disputed facts present.

B.

Robinson was Not Required to Present Expert Testimony
Regarding the Lawyers' Negligence.

The lower court held that: "Without an expert witness, plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that defendants' representation of him in his divorce action fell
below the standard of care." No expert testimony is required in this case to
establish the Lawyer Defendants' negligence - it is patently obvious as shown
by the following facts:
1. Refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza was clearly the most critical
element of the Stipulation (Addendum Ex. 1), as the division of
millions of dollars of properties, the payment of over $1. 7 million to
Ms. Robinson, and other provisions were expressly conditioned
upon or clearly tied to that refinancing. See e.g. ,r13 (the St. George
condominium), ,r14 (the Deer Valley condominium), ,r16 (the
Phoenix Plaza itself), ,r17 (the parking lot property), ,rzo (the
timing of payment of a portion of the equity in an airplane), ,r38,
( reporting of income from the St. George condo), ,r39 (reporting of
Deer Valley Condo and timeshare income), if41 (reporting of Plaza
income), ,r42 (entitlement to pre-payments of taxes), if54 (using
best efforts to refinance and cooperate in providing necessary
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documentation on a timely basis), and if 55 (maintaining status quo
on payment of expenses until refinancing occurs).
2. Clark clearly recognized the importance of a successful refinance
and foresaw the difficulties that would arise if it could not be. He
clearly and specifically instructed Bean to protect Robinson in the
event the Plaza could not be refinanced. It was so important to Clark
that he stated it twice in his email to November 1, 2007 email to
Bean (App. Ex. 2): "There probably ought to be some protections in
the event he is unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to
refinance Phoenix Plaza .... [D]o your best to protect him against bad
things that could happen down the road, like an unforeseen inability
to refinance."
3. Contrary to Clark's instruction, the Stipulation contained no
provisions addressing what would happen in the event the Phoenix
Plaza could not be refinanced. Because it could not be refinanced,
Robinson had no ability to comply with the terms of the Stipulation.
Clark's email to Bean is the "smoking gun" in this case. At the very least,
it creates an issue of fact as to what the standard of care is - even without
expert testimony. The issue is not a complex one about whether Robinson
should have entered a stipulation exchanging cash for property. It is really
quite simple - was Bean negligent in failing to follow the directions from her

13
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senior attorney who clearly saw the dangers of being unable to refinance the
Plaza? Case law demonstrates that no special expertise is required to make
that determination.
The Lawyers are critical of Robinson's previously cited cases George v.
Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) and Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d

348 (Utah 1980) because the fact situations were much more simple than
those presented here. But the reasoning of those two cases that no expert
testimony is necessary if the duty of care is within common knowledge of a
jury finds application in many other cases that are instructive. As aptly stated
in Fleming v. Nicholson, 724 A.2d 1026 (Vt. 1998):
There are situations, however, where expert testimony is not
needed. Where a professional's lack of care is so apparent that
only common knowledge and experience are needed to
comprehend it, expert testimony is not required to assist the
trier of fact in finding the elements of negligence. See Largess v.
Tatem, 130 Vt. 2 71, 279, 291 A.2d 398, 403 (1972) (expert
testimony required to assist trier of fact in answering scientific
and technical questions, but not questions that can be answered
with reference to common knowledge); South Burlington Sch.
Dst v. Calcagni-Frazier-Zajchowski Architects, Inc., 138 Vt. 33, 46,
410 A.2d 1359, 1365 (1980) (expert testimony not required
where facts are such that a layperson would know that breach of
duty of care was proximate cause of injury).
This case does not need expert testimony to show the Lawyers' negligence.

[\

'-i!i1

In Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 1979), the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide him
proper care when, after surgery, he became confused, disoriented, and
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suffered from hallucinations and jumped from his sixth floor hospital window
resulting in permanent paralysis. Id. at 475. The Utah Supreme Court
recognized that normally expert witness testimony was required in a medical
malpractice case "unless the matter is one of common knowledge." Id. at 477.
It reversed summary judgment for the hospital and treating physician
because, in part, the deposition testimony of a registered nurse showed a
clear breach of duty without the need of expert testimony:
the physician's order for medication to be administered "stat"
means immediately, and that to administer medication at 10:00
p.m. when a "stat" order is given at 8:00 p.m. is not compliance
with the physician's order. The testimony of these and other
witnesses would clearly give rise to an issue of material fact,
which should have been resolved by a jury trial rather than the
court attempting to decide the case in the context of a motion for
summary judgment." Id. at 4 78.
Just as the nurse's failure to follow the doctor's instructions in Farrow was
evidence creating an issue of material fact as to negligence without expert
testimony, so does Bean's failure to follow Clark's instructions.
In Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982), summary judgment
was reversed because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the attorney's conduct breached the standard of care when an attorney failed
to pay $400 to opposing counsel to stop a foreclosure sale, reduce the
arrangement to writing, confirm it by letter, or take other steps to ensure that
his client's home was not sold at foreclosure. Id. at 614. The record reflects no
testimony by an expert witness, but the Court concluded: "reasonable minds
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could differ on the question of whether the attorney's actions in this matter
measured up to the standard of care required of attorneys in their
professional duties." Id. at 615.
In Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2007) the plaintiff sued his
former attorneys and an expert medical witness for malpractice on the
grounds that the attorneys failed to properly communicate with a medical
expert who was then not available for trial, causing the client to accept a
lesser settlement in the underlying personal injury case. The client offered no
expert testimony, and the trial court entered a directed verdict in the
defendant attorneys' favor. The Kranz court reversed stating:
Ordinarily, expert testimony is required in a legal malpractice
case. But when the attorney's "duty is so basic that it may be
determined by the court as a matter of law," expert evidence is
not required to establish the attorney's duty of care .... In other
words, "[e]xpert testimony is not required in legal malpractice
cases where the issues are not 'beyond the knowledge of the
average person,' or are 'within the ordinary knowledge and
experience of laymen .... Or ... "[t]he most appropriate application
of the common knowledge doctrine involves situations where
the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone
of average intelligence and ordinary experience."
We also have observed that "expert testimony may not be
necessary to establish proximate cause in every legal
malpractice case, particularly where the causal relationship
between the attorney's malpractice and the client's loss is so
obvious that the trier of fact can resolve the issue as a matter of
common knowledge." 914 A.2d at 861 (internal citations
omitted).
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In short, improper communication between attorneys and an expert witness
was deemed to be a matter which a reasonable jury could consider without
expert testimony.
In Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1980), the court held that the
plaintiff client was not required to submit expert testimony to establish the
attorney's negligence in failing to follow explicit instructions to insure that
she maintained a first lien position on property she was selling, even though
the documents that were drafted were valid documents (but only gave her a
second lien position). While acknowledging that expert testimony generally
was required in cases of legal malpractice, the Olfe court noted:
That general rule should be subject to the exception that such
expert testimony is not necessary in cases where the conduct
complained of can be evaluated adequately by a jury in the
absence of expert testimony." ... The court reasoned that in this
case, no expert testimony was required because: "[Plaintiff]
seeks to hold [attorney] liable for his failure to effectuate her
intent, even though the documents he prepared were not legally
invalid.... [P]roof of negligence in failing to follow specific
instructions concerning the nature and purpose of the
documents desired does not require expert testimony. This case
is controlled by the law of agency, and the attorney-client
relationship does not alter [attorney's] alleged relationship to
[plaintiff] as an agent to his principal.. .. A jury is competent to
understand and apply the standards of care to which agents are
held .... We conclude that expert testimony was not required to
establish the applicable standard of care and [attorney's] alleged
departure from that standard in order to have a jury determine
the merits of [plaintiffs] allegations that [attorney] was
negligent in that he failed to properly draft documents
consistent with [plaintiffs] instructions.
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286 N.W.2d at 578 (internal citations omitted). See also Jarman v. Hale, 731
P.2d 813, 816 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (countervailing expert testimony not
necessary where the an attorney fails to follow his clients' instructions with
reasonable promptness and care, analogizing that latter situation to one of
principal and agency).
Based upon the foregoing cases, Bean failed to follow her superior's
express instructions on a matter that was obviously critical to the settlement
agreement. Failure to follow a superior's instruction is negligence as in
Farrow. 3 Failure to follow a client's instructions (or in this case, a client's

agent) as in Olfe and Jarman is negligence. Failure to protect a client's interest
as in Jackson is negligence. Failure to follow up on communications as in
Kranz is negligence. In all those cases, no expert testimony was required.

None was required here, and the lower court erred in so holding.
The cases cited by the Lawyers do not teach otherwise. For example,
the Lawyers' best case is Callister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243. The
question there was whether the plaintiff was required to present expert
testimony to show that Snowbird failed to properly warn plaintiff of the
danger of being struck by the tram. That case would be relevant if this Court
had held that expert testimony was still required even if, for example, the
The record is conspicuously absent of any contention that Bean even tried
to negotiate for the protective provisions that she was instructed to include
by Clark.

3
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safety manager for Snowbird had issued a memo to the maintenance crew
instructing them to clear enough snow from under the tram or to expand the
barrier ropes out far enough so that someone would not get hit by a tram or
put up more signs warning of the low tram. It is doubtful that under those

analogous circumstances that expert testimony would have been required.
The question of the Lawyers' negligence is clear, and at a minimum
whether the Lawyers breached their duty of care is a jury question. Summary
judgment was improperly granted on that issue.

C.

The Lower Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Causation.

The lower court held that Robinson's claims were barred because any
damages he suffered resulted from his failure to file a loan application within
15 days rather than from the Lawyers' failure to make the Stipulation
contingent upon Robinson's ability to refinance the Phoenix Plaza. This
holding also was erroneous because it is for the jury to resolve such factual
questions. See Unigard Ins. Co. v. LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984)
(whether proximate cause of injuries was city's failure to keep yield sign
unobstructed or plaintiff's failure to yield when required to do so was a jury
question). As stated in Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct. App.
1993):
Proximate cause is an issue of fact .... Thus, only if there is no
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is
summary judgment appropriate.
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Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred .... In a legal malpractice action this standard
can be distilled to the following: The client must show that if the
attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of professional
competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the
act complained about, the client would have benefited.
The Harline court went on to hold that summary judgment was improper
because despite the client's knowledge of his own fraudulent activity to
transfer assets which caused his bankruptcy discharge to be denied, a jury
question as to proximate cause was presented, i.e. whether a different result
would have been achieved in bankruptcy court had the defendant attorney
suggested that his client amend his bankruptcy schedules to reveal his
"questionable dealings." Id. at 602.
The Lawyers make the astonishing claim that their malpractice caused
no damage to Robinson. It could not be more self-evident that had Bean
included the protective provisions she was instructed to provide that the
entire focus of the divorce action would have changed. The issue would not
have been whether a loan application was made in 15 days, but whether it
was even possible to get a loan. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that
Robinson never could have refinanced the Plaza because of the vacancies and
short-term leases.
Further, the lower court could not decide as a matter of law that the
failure to make an improper loan application within 15 days was the cause of
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Robinson's losses when there were sworn statements by Robinson that prior
to November 17, 2007, Bean had advised him that he did not need to make
the loan application until Ms. Robinson first cooperated and provided the
necessary financial report and lease information to make the loan.
The record below contained Robinson's testimony of the damages he
suffered as a result of not being able to avoid the Stipulation (and later
Decree) because of his inability to refinance. Among other things, he lost all
his significant assets and sources of income; he incurred very substantial
attorneys fees in the many years that he has been trying to protect himself
from Ms. Robinson's relentless collection efforts; and he has served nearly 30
days in jail for a contempt charge because he lacked funds to pay Ms.
Robinson's court-ordered attorneys fees.
The Lawyers also contend that Robinson cannot prove that he suffered
damages because he failed to present evidence to the court that he would
have achieved a better result had the malpractice not occurred. But the proof
that Michael would have been better off is apparent and is a reasonable
conclusion as a matter oflaw.
If Ms. Robinson had refused to enter into the Stipulation because she
would be required to warrant the information she had provided Robinson, or
if she would have refused to make it contingent upon a successful refinance,
then there would have been no settlement (as she testified in her deposition),
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the divorce would have proceeded to trial. Utah case law clearly provides that
generally each party is entitled to that party's separate property and then the
marital property is awarded roughly equally. See Thompson v. Thompson,
2009 UT App 101, 208 P.3d 539; Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). The Lawyer Defendants cannot dispute this standard.
Even if all the properties had been divided evenly (without any regard
to Robinson's significantly greater contributions of pre-marital assets which
were 90% of all the assets), Robinson would still have several million dollars
to his name. Now he has virtually nothing.
That disastrous result would have been avoided if Bean had simply
followed Clark's instructions to make the settlement contingent upon
Robinson's ability to successfully refinance the Plaza (and to require that Ms.
Robinson's representations be accurate). To this day, no court has ever

determined that Robinson actually had the ability to refinance the Plaza.
Indeed, Bean herself testified in her affidavit that the Plaza could not have
been refinanced.
In passing, the Lawyers argue that the ruling of the divorce court
collaterally estops Robinson from arguing that there were any other causes to
his losses other than his failure to file a loan application within 15 days of the
Stipulation. To the contrary, no court has yet determined the issue of whether
the failure to make the Stipulation contingent upon a successful refinance was
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a proximate cause of Robinson's injuries, whether the Lawyers were
negligent; or whether the Plaza could be refinanced. There is no collateral
estoppel. Thus, summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of
causation.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT
GRANTING ROBINSON ADDITIONAL TIME TO COMPLETE
DISCOVERY, SECURE AN EXPERT WITNESS, AND RESPOND
TO THE LAWYERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The lower court denied Robinson's and his new counsel's motion for
extension of time on the grounds that Robinson had failed to meet discovery
and expert witness designation dates and that Robinson did not present a
sufficient basis to excuse "his lack of diligence in completing discovery."
Under the unique facts of this case, these conclusions are unfounded, and the
lower court abused its discretion in denying Robinson's request.
Because of the Lawyers' malpractice, Robinson has been rendered
impecunious - now living primarily only on a modest pension and social
security. He has been facing massive attorneys fees in defending the
underlying divorce which is now finally on appeal to this Court and scheduled
for hearing on March 23, 2015. Because of lack of funds, he has been required
to diligently search for counsel willing to take this malpractice case on a
contingency basis. That has not been an easy task.
Robinson filed the initial Complaint, pro se, on October 31, 2011 in
order to avoid any argument that he did not file within the applicable statute
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of limitations. He continued to search for attorneys to represent him, serve
the Complaint, and prosecute the case. The Lawyers moved to dismiss the
Complaint for untimely service. On May 24, 2012, nearly seven months after
the initial filing of the Complaint, the court denied the Lawyers' motion to
dismiss. The Lawyers' Answer was not filed until July 23, 2012, nearly nine
months after the filing of the initial Complaint. Only then could discovery
commence. Thus, much of the delay in initiating discovery resulted from the
Lawyers' own defensive actions.
The parties then filed their Scheduling Plan and Order, which was
entered on January 2, 2013. After Robinson had retained counsel, after the
Lawyers had pursued dismissal and after the Scheduling Order was finally in
place, the parties diligently pursued discovery. Initial disclosures were
exchanged within one week of the Scheduling Order. The Lawyers then
sought leave and ultimately filed an Amended Answer on February 12, 2012.
Robinson had responded to written discovery and provided supplemental
disclosures by February 20, 2012 and March 8, 2012. On March 22, 2012, a
little over one month after the Lawyers filed their Amended Answer,
Robinson issued his amended written discovery to the Lawyers on March 26,
2012. Third-party discovery was issued to Northmarq Capital (one of
Robinson's mortgage brokers).
The only Scheduling Order set completion of fact discovery for
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June 28, 2013 (only six months). Robinson was to designate any expert
witnesses by July 26, 2013, and expert discovery was to be completed by
October 30, 2013. All dispositive motions were to be filed by November 15,
2013. No trial date was set.
Then, on April 8, 2012, less than three months before the discovery
cut-off date, Robinson's counsel withdrew. On that same date, the Lawyers
filed their Notice to Appoint New Counsel or to Appear. The unexpected
withdrawal of Robinson's counsel, could not have come at a worse time for
Robinson. There was grossly inadequate time to secure new counsel, given
the difficulty initially retaining counsel, much less finding one to take the case
on contingency in its latter stages against lawyers from two of Utah's most
prominent law firms.
Robinson was unable to secure new counsel until August 12, 2013, only
a few days before the response to the Lawyers' motion for summary
judgment was due. In support of his new attorney's motion for extension of
time, Robinson submitted affidavits to the court describing his herculean
efforts to secure new counsel, which was given very short-shrift by the court.
His affidavits showed that almost immediately on his counsels' withdrawal,
Robinson began contacting approximately 20 attorneys including four out-ofstate firms in Wyoming, Texas, Arizona, and California. He was met with
claims of conflict-of-interests or simple unwillingness to take the case for
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professional and social reasons. Robinson also described how timeconsuming the process was because some of the lawyers took over a month to
inform Robinson of their decision to not take the case. Robinson's new
counsel, Mr. Kimball, took several weeks before taking the case which
happened the Friday before the summary judgment response was due. See R.
553 at ,r,r5-6.
Robinson also explained that he was understandably incapable of
representing himself in this action. Thus, he devoted his efforts almost
exclusively to securing counsel in this multi-million dollar case. (R. 554, 555
at ,r,r9, 10). With so much at stake, it was not unreasonable for him to do so
given the dire circumstances he was under. If he had attempted to represent
himself, even more errors were likely to be made making his ability to secure
new counsel on a contingency basis even less likely.
Mr. Kimball jumped into the fray with almost no chance to learn the
facts of the case or to even have time to prepare a comprehensive
memorandum in support of his motion for a mere two-month extension of
time to conduct discovery, designate an expert (which he actually did do only
a couple of weeks later), and file a substantive memorandum opposing the
summary judgment.
These were truly extraordinary circumstances. The court's conclusion
that "Plaintiff did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence
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in completing discovery," (i.e. within the last three months of a six month
discovery period) is completely refuted by the record. Robinson's motion was
meritorious, and there was no lack of diligence either in Robinson's
attempting to secure counsel or in conducting discovery once the issues were
engaged and counsel retained. The modest extension would have caused no
prejudice to the Lawyers, who had filed their summary judgment motion
more than three and one-half months before the dispositive motion deadline
and no trial date had yet been set.
The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly held that motions for
extension of time should be liberally granted unless they are deemed dilatory
or lacking in merit. Energy Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, ,r10,
110 P.3d 158; Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., 2002 UT 39, ,r,r 2729, 48 P.3d 910 (trial court abused its discretion in denying Rule 56(f)
motion). Robinson's motion was neither.
None of the cases cited by the Lawyers to support the court's discretion
to deny the motion for extension of time even come close to the extreme
circumstances of this case. They are therefore inapposite. Instead, even
though stated in the context of a Rule 37 argument, Boice by and through
Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 29, ,r10, 982 P.2d 565 teaches: "On occasion, justice

and fairness will require that a court allow a party to designate witnesses,
conduct discovery, or otherwise perform tasks covered by a scheduling order
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after the court imposed deadline for doing so has expired." That should be the
ruling of this Court here.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the summary judgment granted against
Robinson, and the lower court ordered to grant Robinson reasonable time to
secure new counsel, complete discovery, designate an expert witness and
proceed to trial to recover the millions of dollars he has lost due to the
Lawyers' negligence.

DATED this

·~

!f_ day of February, 2015.

Michael S. Robinson, pro se
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 5
Summary of Evidence Submitted to the Lower Court by the Lawyer
Defendants Directly in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
and which Disclosed Issues of Material Fact

The Lawyer Defendants filed their Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 301-496). Attached as Exhibit 10 to that

memorandum was [Robinson'sJAnswers to Defendants First Set of Requests for
Interrogatories, dated March 8, 2013 (R. 403-13):

Admission No. 3: Prior to and during the mediation Ms. Bean expressly
told Plaintiff that she would protect Plaintiff and represent his
interests. Plaintiff also understood that Mr. Clark would properly
protect my interests by supervising Ms. Bean in all aspects of the
divorce ....
Admission No. 5: Within a week of the mediation, Ms. Bean advised
Plaintiff that Plaintiff"was not required to perform" because Ms.
Robinson refused to provide updated information in order to assist
me in the application for refinance. Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that
Ms. Robinson was first to breach and that there "was essentially no
agreement." (R. 404) ....
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 5: But for the proper protections Mr.
Clark instructed Ms. Bean to include in the settlement documents
Plaintiffs pension would not have been targeted by Ms. Robinson. Ms.
Robinson has been unrelenting in her attempts to have Plaintiff found
in contempt for failing to pay the amounts set forth in the stipulation
which Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff to sign. (R. 405) ....
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 8:Plaintiff relied upon the advice of the
Defendants as to the best ways to deal with any information provided
by Ms. Robinson, including the "Handwritten Analysis" [wherein Ms.
Robinson made representations as the net monthly income of the
Plaza, which were then used to determine the Plaza's stipulated value].
(R. 408) ....
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In Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: In addition to John Gottschall
mentioned above [Ms. Robinson's mortgage broker who provided
declarations in the divorce action stating that the Plaza did not meet
loan requirements], Steve Clifford, mortgage broker at NorthMarq in
Denver, advised [Robinson] regarding the conditions under which a
lender would approve a loan which were that 90% of the rentable
space in the Plaza had to be rented under acceptable, long-term leases.
Steve Clifford made it clear that the 90% was mandatory. Plaintiff
advised Ms. Bean of this information ....
In addition, Mark McMullen, an underwriter at River Source
[mortgage company] reviewed the lease information and said that his
company could "not have closed the loan" and said that in order to be
counted as income for the purpose ofloan repayment back in 20078,
leases had to have two years remaining. He also added that the
requirements were even tougher as of the time of the conversation.
Eric Wadley was vice president of Lehman Brothers commercial
lending. When I could not find financing anywhere else, I thought that
maybe he could help me, as he's married to my oldest daughter. He
reviewed the situation and said that Lehman Brothers lending
underwriting had gotten very strict back in August 2007, and that his
company would not provide a loan for the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 409) ....
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 13: Ms. Bean graduated from law school
in 2003. From 2004 to 2006 she was a judicial clerk at the Supreme
Court of Utah. When Plaintiff retained Defendants, it appears that Ms.
Bean had less than one year of actual experience in private practice.
Jones Waldo and Mr. Clark assigned Plaintiffs multi-million dollar
divorce case to Ms. Bean who was then allowed to face a significantly
more experienced opponent. Mr. Clark had limited involvement in the
case prior to the time of the mediation.
The night before the mediation Ms. Bean asked Mr. Clark if he
would review the stipulation provided by opposing counsel. In a
brief response, Mr. Clark told Ms. Bean "There probably ought to be
some protection in the event he is unable., notwithstanding his 'best
efforts' to refinance the Phoenix Plaza ... can't tell whether it's a
good deal for him or not, but do your best to protect him against
bad things that could happen down the road, like an unforeseen
inability to refinance.,, In addition, in the same email exchange the
night before the mediation., Mr. Clark stated that "I notice there is a
disclosure provision, but it's not really apposite or thorough. We did
one in Dr. Segal's divorce (also involving Dean) that may be
better.... ,, Mr. Clark was not present at the mediation. To Plaintiff's
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knowledge, Ms. Bean did not consult with or have Mr. Clark review
the final draft of the agreement before it was signed. However, Ms.
Bean advised Plaintiff to sign the agreement in spite of the fact that
the agreement did not include language that would protect Plaintiff
"in the event he was unable notwithstanding his 'best efforts' to
refinance the Phoenix Plaza" or "protect him against bad things
that could happen down the road like an unforeseen inability to
refinance."(R. 410-11) ....
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 14: After the mediation, Ms. Bean
advised Plaintiff that Ms. Robinson's conduct was the "first to
breach" and so essentially there was no agreement and therefore
Plaintiff was not required to file the application. Ms. Bean advised
that because of Ms. Robinson's "first breach" the agreement would be
set aside and would be renegotiated. Ms. Bean repeated this to
Plaintiff over the course of several months and the arguments made
by Defendants in motions and hearings at subsequent proceedings
were based upon the same premise. (R. 411) ....
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 15: Plaintiff asked for current loan
quotes for the multiple "pre-qualified" loans that Ms. Robinson's
mortgage broker provided. Plaintiff contacted River Source Life
Insurance Company, and it supplied a mortgage application. Plaintiff
obtained as much information as he could to submit the application.
However, Ms. Robinson did not produce the required YTD [year-todate] income and expense reports requested by Ms. Bean from Ms.
Robinson and her counsel. Ms. Robinson's attorney, when asked by
Ms. Bean for the information, advised in a letter or email that those
types of reports were not customarily supplied until around March of
the following year, just ahead of the tax season. Ms. Bean was not
successful in getting that report until February 22, 2008.
Plaintiff also contacted another broker, Steve Clifford with
Northmarq in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Clifford said he had lender [sic]
that was interested in the property. Columbian Mutual Life Insurance
Company, and supplied Plaintiff with an application. Plaintiff was able
to provide him with all the requested documents in December 2007,
with the exception of the required YTD income and expense report that
Ms. Robinson and her counsel had refused to provide. Plaintiff sent
Mr. Clifford all the other documents and filled out the application,
but that application, just like the one from River Source, also
required that at least 90% of the Phoenix Plaza be under long term,
valid, not in default, leases acceptable to the lender. The Phoenix
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Plaza at the time of the mediation was only 72% under valid long
term leases, and by December when Plaintifffilled out the
application for Columbian Mutual Plaintiff had still not received the
necessary information from Ms. Robinson or her counsel to
complete an application. (R. 411-12).
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The Lawyer Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (R. 580-696) contained the following evidence:
1. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, which tied the

division of nearly all (and certainly the most valuable properties and
sources of income) to the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza . (R. 603616). 1
2. The Divorce Decree (R. 636-649), which incorporated wholesale the
terms of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement.
3. A series of email communications (R. 651-681). These emails have
been set out in chronological order and are attached as Appendix
Exhibit 8.
4. Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admissions
(R. 683-692), which made the following statements and had the

following evidence attached:

1

Page 3 of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement is missing from this
part of the record. However, its terms are fully set forth in the Divorce Decree (R.
636-649)
1

ADMISSION NO. 3. Admit that, at the end of the mediation on
November 2, 2007, Defendant Melissa Bean informed you that you
could verify the information received from Debra Robinson during the
mediation and did not have to sign any stipulation that day.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that at the end of the mediation he was
aware that he could verify the information disclosed by Ms. Robinson
and her attorneys at the mediation prior to signing the document.
However, Ms. Bean also advised Plaintiff that she was his attorney and
assured him that the agreement protected Plaintiffs interests
In an effort to respond to Interrogatory No. 1, which requests and
explanation of "each Request for Admission" that Plaintiff did not
unconditionally admit, please accept the following: Ms. Bean assured

Plaintiff that the document he was to sign did in fact protect his
interests. Even after it was discovered that Ms. Robinson's
information was incorrect, Ms. Bean assured Plaintiff that his
interests were protected because the terms of the document were
impossible to meet and could be cured by additional mediation.
ADMISSION NO. 5. Admit that, after the mediation on November 2,
2007, Defendant Stephen Clark and Melissa Bean advised you to file an
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to the phrase "after the mediation on
November 2, 2007'' as being vague as to the timeframe involved.
Without waiving said objection, Plaintiff admits that he and his
attorneys/the Defendants discussed the need to file an application to
refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property. However, Plaintiff denies that

Defendants "advised" him to file the application within the
timeframes outlined in the settlement agreement.
In an effort to respond to Interrogatory No. 1, which requests an
explanation of "each Request for Admission" that Plaintiff did not
unconditionally admit, please accept the following: Plaintiff and his
attorneys discussed the fat that before an actual application was
filed, which application would have cost over $42,000, they would
have to show an occupancy rate o/90% with valid leases that were
acceptable to the Lender. As indicated in Ms. Bean's June 13, 2011
affidavit, which is attached here to as Exhibit 1, Ms. Bean made
repeated requests from Ms. Robinson's counsel to provide Plaintiff
with monthly accounting reports, including year-end 2007 reports.
After the mediation, Ms. Robinson failed to provide this additional
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information. Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that Ms. Robinson's conduct
was the ''first to breach" and therefor Plaintiff was not required to
file the application. Ms. Bean did not receive this information until
months after the mediation and long after Plaintiff needed the
information to be able to timely pursue refinance of the Phoenix
Plaza Property. Further, after the mediation Plaintiff and his
attorneys learned that the occupancy rate was far below what had
been represented and far below what was needed to refinance the
property. Plaintiff and the Defendants also learned that the net
income from the property was $75,000 less that was represented at
the mediation. In spite of this, Plaintiff did obtain tow refinance
applications, one from River Source Insurance Company and one
from Columbian Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiff provided the
brokers with all available documentation. Plaintiff and the
Defendants were advised that the refinance was not available
because lease requirements were not met, and that the percentage
of leased space in the Plaza was far below the minimum
requirement. Ms. Bean advised that because of Ms. Robinson's ''first
breach" the agreement would be set aside and would be
renegotiated. Even though the refinance, by definition, was not
available, and the time frame had passed, both Ms. Bean and Mr.
Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an
application. However, because of the foregoing, Plaintiff was unable
to complete an application. This whole process would have been
avoided if Ms. Bean had followed Mr. Clark's instruction to be sure
to include language in the settlement agreement accounting for the
possibility that Plaintiff could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza
Property.
ADMISSION NO. 6. Admit that, between the date of the mediation on
November 2, 2007 and the date that Debra Robinson filed her Motion
for Entry of Decree of Divorce on February 7, 2008, you did not file an
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he did not file an application to
refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property between November 2, 2007 and
February 7, 2008. However, please see Plaintiffs response to Request
for Admission No. 5, which is incorporated herein by reference.
In addition to the foregoing and in an effort to respond to
Interrogatory No. 1, which requests and explanation of "each Request
for Admission" that Plaintiff did not unconditionally admit, please
accept the following: As Defendants know, the underwriting
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requirements of the lenders showed that any completed application
was futile because any loan would require 90% of the property to
be under current leases approved by the lender. As a result, and as
Defendants know, Plaintiff was unable to complete or file an
application. This whole process would have been avoided if Ms.
Bean had followed Mr. Clark's instruction to be sure to include
language in the settlement agreement accounting for the possibility
that Plaintiff could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property.

Git
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5. Exhibit 1 to Robinson's Response to Request for Admissions was the
Affidavit of Melissa M. Bean, dated 6/13/11 (R. 688-692). Therein, Bean

Q

made the following statements under oath:
2. We originally entered into mediation on November 2, 2007, in an
attempt to craft a financial settlement to resolve the divorce action.
The parties owned a number of real estate properties including a
mall in St. George, Utah called the Phoenix Plaza. At that mediation,
Petitioner [Robinson] relied upon financial information provided
by Respondent [Ms. Robinson] as to the leases and the monthly
income stream into the Phoenix Plaza before he agreed to
refinance it and buy Respondent out of the property. He relied on
the information from Respondent because she has always
negotiated rents on the property, the CAM fees and the leases for
the tenants.

Q

G

G;

3. Specifically, in agreeing to the stipulation, Petitioner relied upon a
document prepared by Respondent and given to the parties CPA
that the occupancy rate of the Phoenix Plaza was 95% and would
be confirmed at the time that Petitioner would refinance the
property. Petitioner also relied upon Respondent's
representation that the Plaza would generate annual net income
of $525,000 with a reasonable value for the Plaza of
$7,000,000.00. Without those representations, Petitioner would
not have entered into the stipulation.

Gi)

GJ

4. The stipulation required that Respondent would manage the
property until it was refinanced and she would provide regular

monthly reports and year end reports.
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5. Respondent was also ordered to provide regular bookkeeping and
accounting for other properties, although she did not or did so

untimely.
6. After the stipulation, Respondent was required to provide certain

~

financial information to Petitioner that would allow him to
pursue the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza such as monthly
accounting reports, including the year end 2007 reports. I
repeatedly requested the information from Respondent's
counsel, but it was not received until February of 2008-long
after Petitioner needed the information in able to timely pursue
the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza and three months after
mediation.
7. In addition, after the mediation Petitioner learned that the
occupancy rate was far below what had been represented by
Respondent and far below what he needed to be able to refinance
the property. As confirmation, Petitioner received a letter from
Columbian Life Insurance Company that his loan application
required a ninety percent occupancy rate and the application would
need to be returned by January 26, 2008; yet, the Phoenix Plaza did
not have a ninety percent lease rate.
8. Petitioner also learned that the net income was $75,000.00 less

than what Respondent had [represented] and upon which
Petitioner had relied at mediation.
9. Respondent also was required to assist Petitioner with

preparing and filing the loan application for the refinance and
she did not do so.
10. Once the fundamental flaws about the value and occupancy rate

became clear and once Respondent failed to provide the
necessary financial documents and insure the necessary leases
to allow a refinance, I asked opposing counsel to return to
mediation, pursuant to our stipulation, to try to resolve these issues,
but they were unwilling to return to mediation

11. ...
12. We, therefore, moved the Court to set aside the stipulation

because Respondent had provided inaccurate and material
5

information as to the occupancy of the Phoenix Plaza and failed
to provide the financial information to allow Petitioner to
pursue the refinance. Respondent's failure to provide the
financial information was the first breach of the agreement1
although certainly Petitioner's reliance on inaccurate
information also made the refinance impossible because [ J
according to his lender, the occupancy was so low as to make the
property unstable in the eyes of a lender.
13.1 believe that Respondent's actions in providing information that
was not accurate as the value of the asset and its occupancy violated
the standards of good faith and [fair] dealing and her failure to

provide monthly and regular accounting constituted the first
breach of the stipulation. Moreover, because the property did not
have the requisite leases, Petitioner could not refinance it.
14. This is the end of my affidavit.
DATED this 13 th day of June, 2011.

/sf Melissa M. Bean
[NOTARY BLOCK]
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7

Summary of Evidence Submitted by Robinson in
Support of His Motion for Extension of Time to
Respond to Summary Judgment Which Bore on
Merits of Summary Judgment Motion.

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7
Summary of Evidence Submitted by Robinson in Support of His Motion
for Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment Which Bore on
Merits of Summary Judgment Motion.

1. From the Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding
Extension to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 552-562).
7. Attached are some emails between myself and former divorce counsel
Defendants Stephen Clark and Melissa Bean, see Exhibits A and B. In
Exhibit A Bean tells me: "... Debra has performed, but it is too late and
her tardiness makes the agreement impossible to effect and because
she was the first to breach (on the plaza, deer valley (sic), etc) (sic), you
don't have to perform." This was the advice I had been given
previously regarding my attempts to refinance some property., and
this advice led directly to the disastrous consequences of the
property division in my divorce. I wish to depose her about it.
8. In Exhibit B, regarding the property division agreement, Clark tells
Bean: "There probably ought to be some protections in the event he is
unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to refinance Phoenix Plaza."
Further: "I notice there is a disclosure provision, but it's really not
apposite or thorough. We did one in Dr. Segal's divorce (also invovling
(sic) Dean) that may be better (e.g., in this one they say they have
disclosure - it should probably say "in connection with entereing (sic)
into this agreement the parties have fully disclosed all income, assets,
liaibilities (sic), etc (sic) of any kind ..." Also, "(d)o your best to protect
him against bad things that could happen down the road, like an
unforeseen inability to refinance." Had this advice been followed by
Bean I believe that my property division would have been vastly more
fair, and I want to depose her regarding this email, and depose Clark to
see ifhe feels his instructions were followed." Attached as Exhibits A &
B to the Interrogatories were the cited emails.
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2. Attached as Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Leave to File Sur Sur Response (R. 699-716) was another copy of the Bean
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Affidavit (R. 708-712) (which also was attached to the Lawyer Defendants'
submission to the court (R. 688-92).
3. Attached as Exhibit C to the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Leave to File Sur Sur Response (R. 699-716) was the Additional
Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding Extension to Respond
to Summary Judgment Motion (R. 714-716). Therein, Robinson stated under

oath as follows:
2. When I went to mediation with my ex-wife (Debra) I
had little knowledge of the value of the marital properties. Debra
has a degree in accounting and an MBA, and had been paid to do
the accounting for my properties for years. As my wife and paid
accountant I had relied upon her for all financial matters and
was not initially suspicious of her representations. Debra had
provided our CPA with a document that overstated the income
from the Phoenix Plaza. She represented a 5% vacancy and net
of $525,000 per year before debt service. The tax return for that
year later showed that she had overstated the income by
approximately $75,000 per year.
3. With perfect hindsight I would have arranged for
independent valuations of the property, but Defendant Melissa
Bean (Bean) never suggested such to me, and we went to
mediation relying upon Debra's unsupported and fictitious
numbers. During the mediation itself I made several calls to
realtors to get an opinion on the value of the Phoenix Plaza,
because Debra represented it having a much greater value than
seemed appropriate to me. Bean was present while I made these
calls and knew I was concerned about the proper value of the
property, yet did not protect me against an improper valuation
in the stipulation.
4. Debra immediately refused to provide me with YTD
[year-to-date] Income and Expense Report, which was necessary
for any loan application to be complete. After Debra's refusal to
provide the required documentation, within four days of the
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mediation I called Bean to alert her to that problem and to
matters which the mediation had totally failed to address. Bean
told me within four days that Debra was in breach of the
agreement for not providing the year-to-date (YTD) income and
expense report I had requested as a prelude to refinancing the
commercial property.
5. The requirement from the mediated agreement was to
apply for the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza within 15 days, and
all lenders told me a YTD was required for a loan application.
After assurances from Bean that Debra had committed the first
breach, I was reluctant to spend approximately $43,000 to apply
for a loan, and a further $40,000 payment at the time oflender
commitment, all for an application I knew would be rejected out
of hand without YTD information. At the mediation Debra had
provided me with loan quotes from a broker and assured me
that the refinance was available. In fact, the loan quotes had
been provided to me by a broker, to whom Debra had given false
information as to the Phoenix Plaza's percentage of leased space.
I did not know the whole mediation proposal was based on
misinformation provided by Debra. The Phoenix Plaza never
qualified for the required loan. I relied on Debra's
representations, and on Bean's commitment to protect my
interests.
6. After the application deadline had passed and Debra
had not furnished the required YTD I believed that I was not
obligated because of Bean's multiple statements to me
concerning Debra's first breach.
7. Later Bean told me that maybe I should try to get a loan
although Debra continued to breach the agreement, and it was
months before Debra provided the necessary report.
8. Melissa confirmed her earlier directions in March when
she verified in writing in an affidavit (See Exhibit B) what she
had told me ... Debra was in breach and I was not required to
perform.
9. Later applications proved that tenant defaults and
insufficient leased space percentages made any refinance
impossible. The percentage of leased space was almost three
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times greater than a lender would allow, and six times greater
than the figures Debra provided to our CPA and which we relied
on at the mediation. I hope to ask Bean in deposition why we did
not have better information before signing the stipulation, and
further why I was not protected in the event I was given false
information by Debra or she otherwise failed to cooperate.
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by the Lawyers (R. 651-678)
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 8
Chronological Presentation of Emails Presented
by the Lawyers (R. 651-678)

11/2/07

Signing of Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement.

11/17 /07

Putative date by which loan application was to be made
[providing Ms. Robinson cooperated and provided necessary
lease and financial information).

NOTE:

NO EMAILS FROM 11/2/07 THROUGH 11/17/07 where Bean or
Clark allegedly instructed Robinson to make loan application.

11/26/07

10:52 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Have you received the
information from Debra and/or me that you need to review
the mall status? I have the final divorce documents and
perhaps if we are in agreement on matters you could be
divorced before the New Year. Let me know. M

11/29/07

10:49 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa, I'm worried about
the time limit on the refinancing. The interest on a possible
mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza just adjusted to the tune of about
$700 more per month. The government is saying that it will do
whatever's necessary to help the struggling economy, so most
analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in
January. I need to get a rate that is reasonable, and may need
more than the allowed time to secure good financing. I don't
think I can live with the huge interest penalty to Debra,
especially since I am paying the payments and expenses on her
properties until she gets her cash. I didn't know the mortgage
rates would be so unstable, and I am working on funding the
buyout. I will talk to Debra and see if she'll be a little flexible on
the penalty interest.
Also you have not responded to my letter regarding Debra
crediting me her share of the deposits and pre-paid rents. That is
a sizeable obligation to me, as the owner of the Phoenix Plaza,
and any seller would be required to credit those items to the

Also you have not responded to my letter regarding Debra
crediting me her share of the deposits and pre-paid rents. That is
a sizeable obligation to me, as the owner of the Phoenix Plaza,
and any seller would be required to credit those items to the
buyer. The amount is substantial and will have to be determined
through the leases.
I do not want to finalize the divorce if these problems can't be
resolved. What we're talking about is 20 years or more of my life,
starting at age 60, when I cannot live the lifestyle I am
accustomed to, and will be buried in debt, so even a thousand or
two on my monthly loan payment will make a big difference. I
will definitely need more time to secure and close a mortgage. I
feel like an idiot, in this thing, because I allowed my own interest
in settling and the encouragement of attorney and mediator to
press me on a decision which is disadvantageous, somewhat
unfair, and permanently damaging. Debra would never have
allowed a firm value to be placed on the Demi Plaza in Sandy,
based on the net rental income .... no, she forced me to agree to
guarantee her a sale price on the property. I just feel stupid, but
it's always been my nature to capitulate in order to have peace.
Maybe its bad practice, but I really want to know if it would be
possible to "drop" the divorce in order to get back to the
bargaining table. Is it possible? Michael.
10:53 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Please see if Debra will
agree re; the time limit and whether she will simply agree on
that matter of the deposits and pre-paid interest. If she will not
agree and you want us to set aside the agreement we will need
to begin working on that matter, but as I've stated setting the
agreement aside is a 50-50 shot at best, so to the degree that you
and Debra can make agreements, that will be better or we
should see about a follow up mediation with Karin Hobbs. M
1:57 p.m. Robinson to Bean: I have already approached Debra on
the deposits and prepaid rent ... unanswered as yet. But I don't
think that will be a problem. I am very concerned about the
harsh delay penalties and do wish a reasonable extension. On a
loan that big, timing is so important, and I can't just grab the first
mortgage available, when it's about my life for the next 20 years.
She shouldn't be unhappy about that, as it could have easily
taken a year or two to dispose of all the properties for an
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equitable split, had we done it the other way. I think I may need
as much as six months from the agreement date to make the
financing arrangement and cash her out, and that is very
conservative. I don't mind paying an interest rate that reflects a
realistic return ... which would a 7.00% a fairer deal. It shouldn't
be a punitive rate, as long as I'm trying to finish the deal. Michael
2:20 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Well, we need her agreement to
modify. She [Ms. Robinson] said she would work with you on
getting a good deal on the mortgage - are you two working on
this? M.
3:52 p.m. Robinson to Bean: We are working on it, but rates
have been doing a bit of a roller coaster. If I can lock a rate
slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress, but I may
still need an additional month or two, and I think that's
reasonable. Michael.
5:57 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael: I spoke with Dean tonight.
He has just spoken to Debra and it appears that she is getting
less willing to discuss ongoing modification.
I did discuss the deposits and prepaid rents with Dean
The deposits they do not as an issue for discussion - because if
you pay out a deposit to a leaving tenant you will get a new one
with the new tenant.
It is the same with pre-paid security deposits-first and last
months, etc. If someone moves out then you would get the same
monies back from the new tenant. So as to the deposits and
prepaid rents they don't see them as joint financial issues. They
view them as items that you will deal with as the owner of the
mall. We don't have anything in the agreement about it, so we
don't have a position to force them to share those issues with
you.
As to the timeline for refinancing and the rates, there is a chance
that Debra might be flexible, but my concern is that rates might
just as well go up and then you would also be in a mess and want
to totally redo the deal. I think if you can [get] a rate in the next
week that is good, ou should lock it so we can get the documents
in to the court before the end of the year.
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Dean and Debra might (a very tenuous might) be willing to meet
with Karin [Hobbs the mediator] for a 3 hour follow up session
to tweak minor details, but they are willing [sic] to redo the deal.
So to the degree that you can continue to work with your
mortgage lender and other financial gurus to finalize details I
think we should move towards finalizing everything, so you can
have a fresh start in the new year. M
11/30/07

9:22 a.m. Robinson to Bean: The deposit issue is a simple one.
Since it is a real liability to us as the owners, and would have to
be given as a real credit to any buyer, it needs to be credited as
the "closing" with Debra. I would lower my net in a sale by at
least $25,000 - $35,000. If Dean has any accounting experience,
he would understand that this is a slam-dunk. There is no
question that she owes it. I will call you. Michael.
10:37 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Melissa, We have several
fundamental problems with this agreement, and I want it
stopped until we can have an additional mediation. I'm going to
list the items, so you can identify the agreement paragraph that
relates.
Paragraph 39
This is a big problem, because I will not have the benefit of the
income from the Deer Valley Condo from which to pay my part
of the taxes. She is apparently putting the money in a separate
account, which is not fair to me. She can't have it both
ways .... collecting all the money for herself-roughly $40,000 to
$50,000-and then making me pay taxes on money I never saw
or had any use of. At the same time she is sequestering the rents
from Deer Valley in her personal account, I am forced to make
the payments and pay for any expenses which she incurs on that
property. How would Debra like it if she were given none of the
income from the Phoenix Plaza during the interim period, but
had to pay taxes on her share of the $50,000 plus per month that
is coming in? It is patently unfair and needs to be resolved,
either making half the collected income mine, or dismissing my
expense, mortgage, and tax liabilities. My suggestion is that all
income from all properties goes into a common account until
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the Phoenix Plaza refinance is completed and Debra is paid
off.
Paragraph 41
Virtually all the income is coming from the Phoenix Plaza, the
Sandy Retail Center, and the Deer Valley Condo. Since I am
paying all the mortgages and expenses on the other properties
until I pay Debra her share of the Phoenix Plaza, it is consistent
and fair to establish the "net income" which is to be shared
under the current agreement, be reduced by any mortgages or
expenses I am forced to pay on the properties granted to Debra.
If there is any interest in a fair agreement, Debra and Dean
should not have a problem with that.
General
The security deposits and last month's rent deposits are a
significant amount of money. No title company, realtor, or
banking institution would dismiss those as unimportant. Debra
needs to give me credit for her half of those deposits at closing,
because it is an obligation which should have been in a separate
trust account and not spent. If I sell I need to give my buyer full
credit for those trust items. Since Debra is seller her share to me,
it is simply a matter of honest business to give a credit for the
deposits which are hers.
Debra and I have discussed the impending roof situation at the
Phoenix Plaza, as we had multiple leaks over our best tenants'
spaces during the monsoon season. Because we have around
$62,000 in CAM fee adjustments coming to us during the next
several months, I had suggested that we could use that money to
apply a new roof. Our belief was that it would cost $30,000$40,000 for the roofing. We both agreed that it needed to be
done immediately, and our conversation led me to believe that
the back CAM fees could be used for that purpose, with her
having the right to charge the tenants for her share of the
expense. This is something she is reneging on. She is collecting
the back CAM fees, and I haven't yet seen any share of them ... .l
don't know exactly where she's keeping them, but she has
indicated she's holding them and that they will be divided. Since
the roofing issue is urgent, I need to have my share of the
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delinquent CAM fees in order to start the roofing project, and I
would like her to cover her side of the roofing costs, as any buyer
would have insisted on a new roof, and any appraisal would
have reflected that as a substantial deficiency. Debra does have
the right to get her money back by billing the tenants at the end
of the year, so it isn't going to hurt her.

I am shopping rates on the Phoenix Plaza refinance. The rates
are volatile, and it is expected that the interest rates will drop
again in December or January. I may need S-6 months rather
than the 120 days before interest begins. Since the interest
rate controls my life for years hence, it [is] not a decision I can
rush, especially with the [exorbitant] prepayment
penalties ... which would be triggered by a subsequent
refinance for a lower interest rate. I need the best rate
available in the next couple of months.
It is not fair that I pay 8% interest when I have to also pay all
mortgages and expenses during that period. It is excessively ·
punitive and there should be no interest if I am actively pursuing
my refinance and, at the same time, paying all Debra's expenses
and allowing her ½ of any "net" income.
These things need to be dealt with, and I suggest a couple of
hours of mediation could take care of it.
Thanks for your help in this matter.
Michael
10:40 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Thanks for your outline of issues.
That is helpful for me. As to Paragraph 39-we can propose that
everything go into a common pot.
Paragraph 41-the same.
As to Phoenix Plaza maybe we can go over the rents, etc. but
from my impression yesterday I'm not sure how far they will
budge. I'm pretty sure that we won't necessarily get 5-6 months
for you to refinance.
However, all that said, why don't we set up a half day mediation
with Karin Hobbs asap so we can get everything resolved. I will
let you know when we can get something scheduled. Thanks, M
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12/5/07

3:37 p.m. Reese to Bean: Melissa, I talked with Dean Andreasen
and he said he had talked with his client and she does not want
to participate in mediation again. However, she is willing to talk
with our client to get the final matters resolved. If you have any
questions let me know. Thanks, Ashlee
3:53 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, My understanding
yesterday was that Dean agreed, however, it appears that Debra
will not agree. To that end, if you and Debra can make any
concessions that is the most likely way that we can resolve
things. Otherwise, they will likely pursue simply submitting the
documents at the first of January. M.
4:19 p.m. Andreasen to Bean: Melissa- I just told Ashlee in a
telephone conversation that Debra does not want to participate
in another mediation session but she said she would
communicate with Michael directly to get everything
resolved. Dean
4:20 p.m. Bean to Andreasen: Also is the time then still ticking
on the refinance or can we agree that when the parties reach
their own internal resolution that will trigger the time? M
4:46 p.m. Robinson to Bean: If the mediation and the document
which was produced thereby are governed by "good faith", then
the matter of the deposits and prepaid rents needs to be
addressed. Omission of those items was simply an oversight and
does not, in anyway, change Debra's obligation as the seller of
her share to me. I assume the same on the Sandy retail center ...
That she is entitled to have me pay half the deposits/prepaid
rents on it. That is only fair. Everyone here, possibly including
you, doesn't seem to think that taking another $25,000 or so
from me makes any difference. There is no accountant, loan
closing officer, or real estate agent that would not agree with my
position on this. Nevertheless, I would let that go if Debra can
show us the signed leases which substantiate her claim of
$519,000 in net income after expenses. I've given into her on
everything else, so since her figure was the source of the Plaza's
selling price, it is only fair that the deal is not a deal if the figure
wasn't correct. We need to see the real figures on gross and net
rental income in order to finish this deal. Though the whole
distribution is very unfair to me, in terms of the pre-marital
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assets, I think I can live with everything else. So long as Debra
proves enforceable rents that substantiate her income figures, I
will proceed with finding financing and getting the deal done.
Michael. P.S. I thought Debra was obligated to accept the
clarifying mediation as well as her share of the expense. I'd like
to proceed with that, if we can't get what we need to show that
there was indeed good faith in the first mediation.
4:4 7 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Why don't you go ahead and
present that email to her and advise that if she will comply with
your requests you will sign off on all the documents within ten
days? That might be the carrot needed. M
5:12 p.m. Andreasen to Bean: Paragraph 16.B. of the Stipulation
provides that Michael has a window of 120 days "from the date
the parties sign this Agreement" before the interest starts to
accrue. Also, the loan application was to be filed "within 15 days
of the date of this Agreement." I believe the clock is already
ticking unless the parties modify the terms of the Stipulation.
Dean
5:13 p.m. Bean to Robinson: It appears that we need to get
moving on this immediately then if that is how they are going
to reframe the time. I will see if I can push Dean on this issue.
Have you filed a loan application? M.
7:19 p.m. Robinson to Bean: I am shopping rates and have
several serious lenders. But the rates are fluctuating daily, and
since I need to live with the payment for the next twenty or more
years, I need to get the loan that suits me best. It is expected that
the Feds are going to further lower the rates in the next week or
two to stimulate the economy and help borrowers who are in
trouble. My brokers are expecting a sub-6% loan. Thanks for
asking. Michael. Also, a matter of importance. Debra must turn
over rents on Deer Valley for the time which precedes the
divorce decree. I cannot be expected to pay taxes on income I
don't see. That is only fair. The way she originally presented it,
was that the rent money covered rentals after the proposed
divorce date. Since that isn't true and she about $7,000-$10,000
in income for the Christmas and New Year weeks, please make
sure that is shared and placed in the appropriate joint account.
Thanks. Michael
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12/7/07

7:27 p.m. Robinson to·Bean: Dear Melissa, I'm in trouble. I have
two tenants, Ernesto's, Jr. and Shiloh Books, whose spaces are
being flooded by rain, and I need Debra's help in getting the roof
done properly. During the summer, she agreed, after multiple
calls from tenants, that she was willing to use the back-CAM
payments to help put on a new roof, as long as she was allowed
to bill the tenants ... which is our right under the terms of the
leases. I thought we had an agreement on it, but Debra, of course,
denies it. She remembers saying it, as of a conversation tonight,
but she says tonight, on the phone around 6:30 p.m., there was
"no agreement,, or it would have been included in the mediation
agreement. I pointed out to her that this was outside of the
mediation, but I though[t] she'd never renege on it, as it really
isn't any expense to her ... it's fully reimbursable. As always, she
denied it over and over, and then said to someone in the room
with her, "I know he's recording this." She is ruining my good
will with the tenants by making them endure the water
problems .... and I see no way to save the situation except by
starting the roof work. I cannot do that, as I cannot afford it and
still have enough to get the application started.
Shiloh Brooks called today saying they had a serious leak and
were losing merchandise. Dick Burrow said that he had talked to
Debra, previously, about a small leak in the ceiling. I mentioned
to Debra that Dick had said this, and she said he had never
mentioned a leak. I told her, that [if] I'd known about the leak,
the problem would have been taken care of. She was furious, and
said she had never heard from the tenant that there was a
leaking problem. Denial is her forte, which is why I did start to
record her and keep copious notes of her antics during the last
few years of the marriage.
This problem threatens to ruin me, and I need immediate help,
including Debra's cooperation and participation. She has gotten
about 1.4 million more than she should have had, if marital and
premarital holdings had been strictly adhered to. I think she can
make good on her promise to help with the roofing, with her
acknowledgement that she has the right to bill the tenants for
her half of the improvements.
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She is getting top price for the Mall, but she is now saying that
she never gave me the $519,000 net after expenses figure ... that
all of her figures were monthly. You and her attorney, as well as
the mediator were there. My exact words to her, in front of
counsel and mediator were "You've told me that the net annual
figure is $525,000. Is that correct or isn't it?" She answered, "It's
more like $519,000, give or take a few dollars." I accepted that,
in good faith and it was my basis for figuring an appropriate
value for the Mall, along with my realtors advice that a 7% CAP
[capitalization] rate could be used, but it wouldn't sell for more
than a 7.25 CAP rate. That's where the settled-on sale price came
from, but Debra has not been able to demonstrate that the MallPhoenix Plaza - has ever brought in the figures she has
represented. So, I'm paying top price for pie-in-the-sky. As far as
I know it's an outright lie, at this point, and we need out of the
agreement, since her figures, as the Plaza's accountant, were the
basis for my decision. Since Debra is the accountant, and the net
rental figures were hers, she now needs to prove that that
amount of money, after expenses, is actually coming in. I haven't
seen one month wherein the deposits, less expenses, supported
her figure. Get me out of this. It was not a good faith agreement.
The roof, as well, has to be included in the final agreement. If you
believe that getting new counsel would buy me some time, I
could do that, but I would ultimately wish to re-retain you for
the duration. I need good advice fast, as I feel time and options
are running out, and Debra's dishonesty is an ever-present
problem. If good faith has anything to do with it, the present
agreement must be set aside until these problems are resolved.
Michael
12/9/07

12:26 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Stephen and I reviewed
your situation today and would advise: that you go ahead and
get the roof fixed. Obviously, by your representation you need to
have it repaired and it needs to be done quickly. It appears that
you can use CAM funds or other funds to pay for the roof. We
don't see any reason that we can require Debra to pay for the
roofing expenses. If something goes wrong with the properties
she receives, she likewise cannot come to you for monies to fix
those problems.
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We also don't see how paying for the roof will effect the costs
ofyour loan application-are you somehow being required to
pay some money to get submit your loan application? The
stipulation does require that you both work together to get
the Plaza refinanced-where are you on that? I'm reading
that they will reduce rates again next week-our time at this
point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would
advise you to move forward on doing so.
Have you concluded from reviewing all the documentation to
you that the amount was less than $519,000? Can we prove it
with the proper documentation? I will go back to Dean on that
issue, but need you to show with all the deposits what the
amount is before we request an adjustment in the figure.
We can only get this agreement set aside if we prove that Debra
committed active fraud or concealment-part of the difficulty is
that you had access to all the deposits and anything else that you
wanted to review and you also had the same access to the CPA
and your realtor for input.
Please let me know fl we can prove with some definite evidence
that Debra's numbers were off, and by how much, and then we
can determine if we can revise the figures for the Plaza. Again,
unless we can prove fraud or concealment, we don't have a
strong basis for setting aside the deal otherwise and their
position will be that you simply want a new deal.
Thanks, M
12/10/07

10:38 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa. You have not
addressed the issues in my previous Emails. They are essential.
1) I need to have Debra turn over my share of the income that
she has collected from the Deer Valley Condo. Our agreement
says that the income will be decided on whether the actual
rental period is during the marital duration. I have Emailed
you giving you approximate amounts of income which come
from this Christmas and New Years holiday. Since that is
during our marriage, that is not Debra's exclusive income. We
have agreed that she can keep the rents which apply to
periods after the finalization of the divorce. But any rents

11

earned before the divorce is final need to be put in the joint
account and made available for both expenses and tax
liabilities. Rents received for rentals during the expected
duration of our marriage are approximately $10,000 to date.
2) I need to have my half of the back CAM fees which Debra has
been collecting. These would be helpful to me in getting work
started on the roofing problems. Cash is also critical to
being able to acquire refinancing for the Phoenix Plaza., as
I will be required to pay 1-2% good faith., in order to lock a
rate with a lender.
3) I'm sorry, I've explained this before. I accepted Debra's
estimate of $519,000 in net income before taxes for the
Phoenix Plaza as the basis for determining its value. I'm sure
that you and the mediator both remember me questioning
Debra as to whether her previous net income figure of
$525,000 was correct. She answered "it's more like $519,000
give or take a few dollars." She now denies having said that,
and insists that all figures she gave were monthly./ have not
had access to all of the leases., as she took my documents.,
including my old business records., in February. I have not
seen any of the documents since. She is also the only one
who does the day-to-day accounting on the Plaza., and is
the only who knows what the actual rents are. Since I have
not seen the $640.,000+ in monthly deposits., that she
represented as gross rents including CAMS., I have to
believe her information was not correct. If she cannot
demonstrate that income is actually being paid to us., I
cannot abide by the agreement., and insist on further
mediation. The agreement is not ... in good faith if she
gave erroneous information on the Plaza's income. I just
need her to show that the income is that high. Incidentally.,
the averages for the year., are thousands of dollars per
month lower. This is not insignificant. If the difference is
$3,000 per month in actual collections, then the Plaza's
worth is lowered by $505,263.15. That is staggering
difference, and, ifyou had to pay it, you would be standing
up for your right to an honest figure from Debra. I believe
the difference is greater than the $3,000 per month
estimate., which was based on actual deposit information.
This problem needs to be [taken] care of.
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4) I don't know how much money is available to start work on
the roof. I don't control the checkbook, and I don't know
how much reserve is needed to cover all our typical monthly
bills and our coming Holiday expenditures. I'd like to be able
to write a check for $30,000 to get the job started, but I can't
have our credit damaged by over-extending the account.
Debra actually said a couple of months ago that she was
willing to spend the incoming back-CAM fees on the roofing,
as long as she could bill the tenants for her half, to which
she's entitled. She has reneged on that, so I don't know where
to go from here. The low cap rate we used in figuring the
Phoenix Plaza's value doesn't allow for needed deferred
maintenance-it is a premium price-and the roof is critical
to keeping the tenants happy ... and, simply, keeping the
tenants.
Thanks for looking out for my interests. I wish that we had
asked Debra to sign something guaranteeing her information
was correct, but I somehow assumed that there was a record
of the discussion which would allow me to go back if there
was fraudulent information given by Debra. Let's go back to
Karin for a few hours and see if we can get this right.
Michael
10:42 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, I will write Dean and ask
him about your questions, but as to the net income for the Plaza,
we need to demonstrate why that figure is off. Do you not have
all the documents at this time? I can still ask her to clarify. As
you may recall, Dean indicated that Debra is not willing to
re mediate, but I'll reg uest they consider it based on your
questions below. M
12:09 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Hi, Melissa. I just had a very gentle
conversation with Debra, in which back-CAM collections, Deer
Valley income, and Phoenix Plaza issues were discussed. She
sounds like she'll come through on most of it, but I am very
worried about losing an opportunity to contest the rent figures
and the resultant Phoenix Plaza sale price. She says she's found
that there are several tenants who were paying the wrong
amounts and says that accounts for deposits being short. She is
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assuring me that will be taken care of, but I think the figure may
still be wrong by thousands of dollars. Can we buy some time in
which to document correct lease amounts and establish a short
history of corresponding monthly deposits? She has been
working on negotiating new rents for several tenants, and I
will need signed leases and addendums in order to refinance
the Plaza. Even though we "agreed" on a price, with nowquestionable information, maybe it would be possible to get an
impartial professional appraisal to verify that it isn't completely
out of the ball park. That should create a sense of objectivity and
fairness for both parties. Thanks. Michael
1:12 p.m. Bean to Robinson: I will ask Dean ifwe can buy some
time, however, as of now, he is planning to submit the
documents at the beginning of January. If you and Debra can
agree to an extension, say until January 31 st, then we can execute
an amendment to the stipulation as to the time-extension.
Based on your conversation then, I will wait to see if you two can
agree on those issues rather than following up with Dean
formally.
Please let me know if Debra will agree to an extension. M
8:04 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa. We do have a fraud on
our hands, and I refuse to be robbed of another half-million
based on Debra's misrepresentation. It seems I have to make the
language a little stronger in each email, so that it has a more
powerful impact. Though Debra was cooperative today on
matters of Deer Valley income and distribution of collected backCAM payments, the matter of the incorrect representations by
my "accountant" of the Phoenix Plaza still needs to be corrected.
I use the word accountant" because Debra is the only one
who had the information necessary to give us a current net
income figure during the mediation. In a sense, it gives her two
types of status, one as the respondent in the divorce case, and
the other as a trained professional who understands the
significance of incorrect income information. One of two things
needs to happen: a) Verification of Debra's representation of
net income after expenses needs to be substantiated by
properly executed leases and lease addendums. That will
satisfy me, though I'm very unhappy we've had no months in
which bank account deposits showed the amounts which would
yield such a net amount ... orb) A professional, unbiased,
11
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objective appraisal that gives us a figure of at least $7M. (I don't
require the $7.25M price to be verified, as the $250,000 was
added--$125,000 to Debra's credit and the same to mine-for
her participation in refinancing costs and prepayment
penalties.) You said fraud is a cause to suspend the agreement,
and it needs to be suspended until one of these courses of action
is completed. Please discuss this with Stephen and come up with
a plan. Thank you. Michael
8:43 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, The problem is not your
language, but that you had previously stated that you and Debra
were having discussions on these issues and making some
headway and in addition, I had responded yesterday with the
requirement that we prove that the $519,000 was not properthis response was crafted after conferencing with Stephen Clark.
Tonight there is another series of emails, so I am going to be very
concrete with my response.
To be very clear: I will draft a letter to Dean requesting a
full/accurate disclosure and proof for the monthly income on
the mall and will ask to have Debra demonstrate how she
arrived at the $519,000. To clarify- do you not have
statements to review to show that amount? I will also ask

that we suspend the timeline on requirement to refinance the
mall, however, I would encourage you to continue to use your
best efforts to refinance.
It is my understanding that we forwarded to you the documents
that we received from Debra including the leases. Have you not
received any leases? Do you not have access to them on your
computer? That is what Debra stated previously. I will review
what Dean/Debra sent to us and send them to you again for your
review.
I do not know whether we can get or force the other side to
agree to an appraisal of the mall to now re-calculate the value of
the mall, since that was a value that you and Debra had
negotiated both prior to the actual mediation and then during
the mediation. That said, if we can prove that the amount of

rents is incorrect, then we may be able to renegotiate value.
If Dean and Debra will not provide the accounting or otherwise
agrre to allow you the time to verify the amount, we will likely
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need to move forward and file a motion to set aside the
settlement agreement. If the motion to set aside is granted, then
we would need to renew discovery, perhaps involving a forensic
accounting, and proceed through litigation or renewed
settlement negotiations.
I will draft the letter to Dean this evening and get it faxed in the
morning.
Melissa
12/11/07

8:11 a.m. Robinson to Bean: For some reason, the rent roll is
something I cannot open on either of my computers. Also,
having some of the leases in my computer doesn't verify what
tenants are now paying, since there have been adjustments
over the last few years. Debra is renegotiating some of the
leases which have expired, and those will have to be signed
before any lending institution will touch the refinance. There
are also some leases which existed when we bought the Plaza,
and I do not have any information on them. Debra said
during our last conference call that she didn't know if she had
the leases, and that she thought I had them. That was a real
lapse of memory for her, as she took them in February and
has never returned them.
Another problem has arisen which is downright scary ...Split
Rock, our biggest tenant with around 20% of the leasable space,
[is] not sure they will be renewing their leases. That alone could
destroy me, considering the amount of debt I'm taking on. I
allowed Debra to assume a minimal vacancy rate in the
negotiations, never dreaming that I could have several vacancies
within months of the refinance. Just the realty commissions to
re-rent their spaces would be around $14,000-in a year
wherein my income might not cover the roof, taxes, and some
basic living expenses.
Could you send the lease information in another form ... or paste
into the Email, so I can see it. Thanks.

3/17/08

2:11 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Hi, Melissa, I have asked my broker
repeatedly for the letter, stating that the Phoenix Plaza's
current rental/leasing report shows a percentage of leased
spaces far under the criteria set by the lender for refinance.
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He has proved unwilling to put anything in writing, saying that
the Columbian [insurance company for which Robinson had
an application] speaks for itself. It showed that, in order to do
a refinance, 90% of the property had to be under current
leases. I have sent you the percentages. They don't come close,
even if we believe that the two spaces Debra lied about in the
February report are really leased-which they are not. The
broker also told me that Columbian's new offer has expired,
and that, when we figure out how much of a loan I'll need, he'll
be happy to go back to the company for a new quote.

These are essential facts and we don't need a letter from a
broker to say it:
1) The current leased space is below the lender's
requirement
2) Debra lied about what spaces are actually covered by
leases. Las Palmeras Restaurant and Red Rock Cleaners
are not covered by leases, though Debra shows lease
expirations in 2010 on both of those.
I am still hoping that Steve Clifford, the broker, will send a short
letter to that effect. Yet, the Columbian requirements letter and
the numbers supplied by Debra speak for themselves. What are
we doing about it?
Thanks,
Michael
2:26 p.m. Bean to Robinson: I'm pulling the most current Utah
cases on impossibility and first to breach so we can refocus
our prior pleading to now state-now Debra has performed,
but it is too late and her tardiness makes the agreement
impossible to effect and because she was the first to breach
(on the plaza, deer valley, etc.) you don't have to perform.
Stephen and I conferenced on that on Thursday and will be
renoticing up our new/revised motion and require Dean to
respond and then we will need to argue it. Of course, it is far
more effective to have documentation to support our argument
re: impossibility which is why further support from the lender
would be very helpful. M
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10/10/08

3:56 p.m. Clark to Robinson: Michael, I got your voicemail
further confirming our prior judgment that it will be difficult to
prove fraud in connection with the stipulation.
I do not see so far that the fraud angle is going to be terribly
fruitful, but to the extent you can ferret out misrepresentations
or omissions we can consider raising them in a Rule 60 motion
for relief from the judgment, as we discussed.
I think it would be more helpful to focus on a couple of other
things.
First, if you want to go through Debra's affidavit and provide a
detailed response, I can use that in the context of objecting to
Commissioner Evan's recommendation and asking for an
evidentiary hearing with Judge Iwasaki as the next step in
seeking to block the Decree from being entered. If Judge Iwasaki
essentially rubber-stamps the recommendation and enters the
Decree, we can file post-judgment motions, including a request
under Rule 52 to amend the findings and/or a request under
Rule 59 for an amendment of the judgment. Those rules allow
relief from a judgment or decree based on such things as "newly
discovered evidence," which strikes me as a good possibility
here if we show the changed circumstances by way of affidavits
from you and Gottschall or some other financial guru showing
whatever the case was as of November 2, 2008, newly
discovered evidence as to the facts existing then do not support
the Decree. If all that fails and we have to appeal we will have to
consider a stay on the Decree pending appeal and pursuing an
appeal.
We have 10 days after the entry of the Decree to file a motion
under Rule 52 or Rule 59, so we need to start lining this stuff up
pronto. I will try to focus in the next few days on what kinds of
specific additional info we might need to provide and outline
that and then rely on you to coordinate gathering it.
I hope in the midst of this you can relax on the weekend and we
will hit this again next week.
Stephen
9:42 p.m. Robinson to Clark: Thank you, Stephen. I will get to
work on my end .... and hopefully I'll get some good sleep, which
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has been very difficult. You have mentioned that agreements
entered into because of coercion can be undone. I do think
Debra's constant threatening that, if I didn't sign the agreement
taking the Phoenix Plaza, she would go for 50% of everything.
That scared me, because she told me that three attorneys had
told her should could get half, even though I had owned
considerable pre-marital assets.
That was looking like the ultimate unfairness, so I was
capitulating to her coercive tactics. I hate debt and had lived my
life being very careful about carrying debt. She knew how much I
dreaded debt, because I had always resisted borrowing as a
means to acquiring more property. I had thirty-five apartments
debt free-except for about $170,000-when I married her, and
I was uncomfortable borrowing, especially as I got older and was
more concerned about security than getting richer. I would have
never considered the deal we struck had it not been for her
constant threats about getting "half of everything." Actually, I
told Melissa that Debra threatened to go for 50% if I didn't go
along with her settlement proposal, asking her if that was a
likely scenario. She indicated that was a very possible, if not
probable, outcome. In retrospect my fear put me into a much
worse situation. Let me know if the "coercion" angle is likely to
have any value in getting the settlement agreement set aside.
Michael
10/11/08

3:54 p.m. Clark to Robinson: Michael, this is not "coercion" in the
eyes of the law, and will never suffice to have the agreement set
aside.
In terms of your options, I recall we did a memo for you
outlining the approaches courts take in these matters. We stand
by that analysis. I also recall that by the time we got to
mediation, you and Debra had essentially had the deal worked
out, and you were bargaining solely over the value of the Plaza.
The mediation was preceded by several months of your
strenuous efforts to work something out so you would not have
to endure a drawn-out and expensive litigation process. So while
I can certainly understand and appreciate the concerns you
express herein, they are not new, and they didn't arise as a result
of anything other than choices you made.
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May I suggest that, in addition to the possible approaches I
outlined yesterday, you do one more thing, and that is get an
application for the refinancing of the Plaza on file and pursue it
as vigorously as you can?
If the value has fallen, if the leaseholds are not sufficient, if all the
other terms and conditions cannot be satisfied, then that will be
evidenced by the failure of the actual process, rather than just
expressions of doubt or concern or fear or hesitation. I know you
would prefer that the entire deal be undone and you get your
1031 share, but I can only repeat that is very unlikely to happen,
so you would be well advised to being planning for the
possibility that this deal will be reduced to a court order and you
will be required to comply at risk of being found in contempt of
court, and unless we can demonstrate that you are unable to
comply we will have limited defenses. So that will require
concrete proof that (1) there is no way for you to pay the $1.78
million (or the alternative interest payments) without a
refinancing, and (2) there is no way for you to refinance and
secure that amount of money to pay Debra. In my view, the best
way to do the latter is actually shop loans, put in the application
and go through the process.
10 /11/08

6:00 p.m. Robinson to Clark: Stephen, My mind has gone blank.
In our phone conversation you told me something(s) that I
needed to do right away to assist in my case. I never dreamed I
could forget, but now I have no idea what it was. Could you
refresh my memory so I can start working on it? Thanks. Michael

11/7/08

8:12 a.m. Robinson to Steve Clifford [mortgage broker]: Dear
Steve, The matter of refinancing the Phoenix Plaza is pressing.
I'm providing you with an updated rent roll and personal
financial statement. Please let me know if there s anyone who
would do the deal with reasonable terms.
Thank you.
Michael Robinson
1

11:37 a.m. Robinson to Clark: Dear Stephen, I sent an email to
my mortgage broker, relative to the $3.SM refinance, including
the present lease information and an updated financial
statement. He sent the following answer.
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Michael
--- Begin forwarded message:
From: "Steve Clifford" SClifford@Northmarq.com
To: broncojockey@digis.net
Subject: RE: $3.SM refinance
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 11:12:16 -600
Michael-this would have to be a recourse loan and it
appears that you have little in the way ofliquid assets. I
think it would be difficult to find financing in today's
environment.
Steve Clifford
11:44 a.m. Clark to Robinson: Is there way to do an application
and have it turned down? Or get something more concrete and
admissible?
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